This paper pursues a line of Cass and Shell, who advocate monetary models that are \genuinely dynamic and fundamentally disaggregative" and incorporate \diversity among households and variety among commodities." Recent search-theoretic models¯t this description. We show that, like overlapping generations models, search models generate interesting dynamic equilibria, including cycles, chaos, and sunspot equilibria. This helps us understand how alternative models are related, and lends support to the notion that endogenous dynamics and uncertainty matter, perhaps especially in monetary economies. We also suggest such equilibria in search models may be more empirically relevant than in some other models.
Introduction
Cass and Shell (1980) advocate macro and monetary models with an explicit microeconomic structure. The framework they had in mind was the overlapping generations model of¯at money [Samuelson [1958] ; Shell [1971] ; Wallace [1980] ). They argue \this basic structure has two general features which we believe are indispensable to the development of macroeconomics as an intellectually convincing discipline... First it is genuinely dynamic... Second it is fundamentally disaggregative." They also say that they \¯rmly believe that a satisfactory general theory must, at a minimum, encompass some diversity among households as well as some variety among commodities," although for technical reasons these features \will typically impose a signi¯cant constraint on our ability to derive substantial propositions concerning qualitative e®ects."
Since they wrote these words a new monetary model has been developed that is also genuinely dynamic and fundamentally disaggregative and takes seriously diversity among households and variety among commodities { the search model. While ostensibly quite di®erent, on some dimensions search models deliver very similar predictions to overlapping generations models.
We show here that, like overlapping generations models, search models generate interesting dynamic equilibria including cycles, chaos, and sunspot equilibria. Knowing this helps us understand how alternative monetary theories are connected, and lends further support to the notion that extrinsic dynamics and uncertainty matter, perhaps especially in monetary economies (Shell [1977] ; Cass and Shell [1983] ).
There are several search-based monetary models in the literature. Many assume severe restrictions on how much money agents can carry, typically m 2 f0; 1g (Kiyotaki and Wright [1991] ; Trejos and Wright [1995] ; Shi [1995] ). This is convenient for the same reason two-period-lived agents are convenient in the overlapping generations model: at any point in time we can partition the set of agents into a subset with money who want to spend it and a subset without money who want to get it. Yet m 2 f0; 1g is not an appealing assumption. Recent search models allow agents to carry any m 2 R + . Some versions of this model are notoriously di±cult to analyze (Molico [1999] ). Here we focus on the much more tractable version in Lagos and Wright (2002) { hereafter referred to as LW.
Section 2 reviews the basic LW model. Section 3 goes beyond previous analyses by considering dynamic equilibria, including cycles and chaos. Section 4 considers sunspots. Section 5 concludes. 1 
The Basic Model
Time is discrete. The set of agents A has measure 1. Agents live forever and have discount factor¯2 (0; 1). There is a set of nonstorable goods G. Our version of Cass and Shell's (1980) \diversity among households [and] variety among commodities" is as follows. Each i 2 A consumes a subset of goods G i ½ G, and produces one good g i where g i = 2 G i . Also, given any two agents i and j drawn at random from A, the probability of a single coincidence is
) and the probability of a double coincidence is
In a single-coincidence meeting, if g i 2 G j we 1 A textbook treatment of cycles and sunspots in overlapping generations (and some other) models is Azariadis (1993) . Nonmonetary search models can also display interesting dynamics, but only if the meeting technology has increasing returns (Diamond and Fudenberg [1989] ), which is not the case here. Dynamics have been studied in monetary search models by Wright (1994) , Shi (1995) , Coles and Wright (1998) , Li and Wright (1998) , Ennis (2001 Ennis ( ,2002 , and Lomeli and Temzelides (2002) ; these papers all assume m 2 f0; 1g. call j the buyer and i the seller.
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Let u(q) be i's utility from consuming any good in G i and c(q) = q the disutility of production. The assumption that c is linear is what makes things tractable. Assume u is C n with u 0 > 0 and u 00 < 0. Also, u(0) = 0 and u( ¹ q) = ¹ q for some ¹ q > 0. Let q ¤ denote the e±cient quantity, which solves u 0 (q ¤ ) = 1. We sometimes need u 000 · (u 00 ) 2 =u 0 , which holds if u 0 is log-concave. In addition to goods, there is another object called money that is storable, divisible, and can be held in any quantity m¸0. For now, it has no intrinsic value { it is¯at money.
Each period has two sub-periods, day and night. During the day there is a decentralized market with anonymous bilateral matching and bargaining;
at night there is a centralized frictionless market. Agents do not discount between subperiods here but this is easily generalized (see Rocheteau and Wright [2002] ). All trade in the decentralized market must be quid pro quo, as there can be no credit between anonymous agents (Kocherlakota [1998] ; Wallace [2001] ). We could allow intertemporal trade in the centralized market, but in equilibrium it will not happen since we cannot¯nd one agent who wants to save and another to borrow at the same interest rate.
Let F t be the distribution of money holdings in the decentralized market at t, where M t = R mdF t (m) = M for all t. buyer with m and a seller withm dollars. Let ® be the probability of meeting 2 In LW, double coincidence meetings can occur with positive probability and the results are basically unchanged. Also, in LW there are some general goods that everyone consumes, but this is not important for the model. 3 We keep M t constant here so we can focus on dynamics due exclusively to beliefs.
anyone in the decentralized market and¸= ®¾. Bellman's equation is
We normalize the price of goods in the centralized market to 1 and let Á t be the price of money. Then the problem is
s.t.
where x t is total consumption of goods in G i , y t is production, and m t+1 is money left over after trading. We impose nonnegativity on m t+1 and x t but not y t . Our approach is to allow y t < 0 when solving (2); then, after¯nding equilibrium, one can introduce conditions to insure y t¸0 (see LW).
If we insert y t from the budget equation,
From (3), x t = q ¤ where u 0 (q ¤ ) = 1. Also, W t (m) is linear:
Given this, we can simplify (1) to
4 The¯rst term is the expected payo® from buying q t (m;m) and going to the centralized market that night with m ¡d t (m;m) dollars. The second term is the expected payo® from selling q t (m; m) and going to the centralized market with m + d t (m; m) dollars. Notice the roles of m andm are reversed in these two terms. The¯nal term is the payo® from going to the centralized market without trading in the decentralized market.
We now turn to the decentralized terms of trade. Consider a singlecoincidence meeting when the buyer has m and the sellerm. We use the generalized Nash solution:
By Lemma 1, this reduces to: 
Lemma 2 The bargaining solution is
where m
Proof: One can easily check that the proposed solution satis¯es the¯rst order
Proof: The implicit function theorem implies b q t (m) is C n¡1 and
, where the second equality follows from (7). Since lim m!m (6) and (3) into (4), we have
where
In LW we show there exists a unique V t (m) in a certain class of functions satisfying (8) . 5 To avoid these details in this paper, we can work with the sequence problem,
where the agent takes as given the entire path for (Á t ; F t ).
Since q t (m) and d t (m) are C n¡1 for all m 6 = m ¤ t , so is v t (m). We have thē rst order conditions
In a monetary equilibrium at least one agent must choose m t+1 > 0, and for him (11) holds with equality. Indeed, we claim that all agents choose the same m t+1 = M > 0 in any equilibrium. We show this in several steps.
Lemma 4
In any equilibrium,¯Á t+1 · Á t for all t.
5 This is a nonstandard dynamic programming problem because it is nonstationary and because V t (m) is unbounded due to the term Á t m. The problem can be rendered stationary by including Á t as an aggregate state variable as in Du±e et al. (1994) . The fact that V t is unbounded can be¯nessed by working in the space of functions ¹ V (m) = ¹ v(m) + Ám, where ¹ v is continuous and bounded. See LW.
Proof: From (9) we have
where b q 0 t+1 is given above. If¯Á t+1 > Á t then the left hand side of (11) then we could conclude they all choose the same m t+1 , simply because the marginal cost of acquiring money is constant at Á t given our linear production cost. While v 00 cannot be signed in general (since it depends on u 000 ) we do have the following result.
Lemma 6
Assume that µ ¼ 1 or that u 0 is log-concave. Then in any equilibrium, for all t¸1, we have v 00 (m t+1 ) < 0 for all m t+1 < m ¤ t+1 , and F t is degenerate at M .
Proof: Di®erentiation implies v
00 is the same sign as
where ¡ is a function of parameters that is strictly negative but otherwise need not concern us. Hence, v 00 < 0 for all m in the relevant range if either we assume u 0 u 000 · (u 00 ) 2 for all q, which follows from log-concavity, or we assume µ ¼ 1. Given v 00 < 0, there is a unique solution to (11) at equality, and so all agents choose the same m t+1 . That is, F is degenerate. ¥ The next step is to reduce the model to 1 equation in 1 unknown. To begin, insert v 0 t+1 from (12) into (11) to get
Notice e(q t+1 ) does not depend on t or Á t+1 directly, but only on q t+1 . Now (7) with m = M implies Á t+1 = f (q t+1 )=M , where
Inserting (15) into (13), we get a simple di®erence equation:
A monetary equilibrium is a path fq t g satisfying (16) 
Proof: Let T (q) denote the right hand side of (17) . Calculation shows the stated conditions imply e 0 < 0 and hence T 0 < 0, so there cannot be more than one solution to T (q) = 1. Notice
Hence, T (q ¤ ) ·¯< 1, and there is a solution q s 2 (0; q ¤ ) to T (q) = 1 i®
Hence, q s ! q ¤ as¯! 1 i® µ = 1. The rest is routine. ¥
Dynamics
We now consider equilibria where q changes over time. To begin, denote the right hand side of (16) by R(q t+1 ). Notice R(q t+1 )¸0, f(0) = 0, and lim q!1 f(q) = 1 (at least if we assume u 0 is bounded away from 0). Also
Hence, 8q t+1¸0 there exists a unique q t = g(q t+1 ) such that f(q t ) = R(q t+1 ).
Thus g is single-valued, although h = g ¡1 is generally a correspondence.
Clearly q = 0 is a (nonmonetary) steady state. 6 Under the conditions in Proposition 1 there is a unique monetary steady state q s = g(q s ) > 0. Hence g intersects the 45 o line exactly twice, at 0 and at q s .
Lemma 7 Assume a unique monetary steady state q s exists; then g 0 (q s ) < 1 and g 0 (0) > 1.
Proof: Di®erentiation implies
Inserting (17), we have there is a path from q 0 staying in (0; q ¤ ). 7 We summarize this observation as follows.
Proposition 2 If a steady state q s > 0 exists, there is a ¹ q 0¸q s such that 8q 0 2 (0; ¹ q 0 ) there is an equilibrium starting at q 0 where q t ! 0.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
In Figure 2 , h is a correspondence: given q t there can be multiple values of q t+1 consistent with equilibrium. The Figure is drawn with g 0 (q s ) < ¡1, which implies there is a 2-period cycle. We state this formally, but as the result is standard we only sketch the proof (see Azariadis [1993] ). 7 In the case shown in the¯gure we have ¹ q 0 = q s because h is single valued; in general, when h is not single valued we can have ¹ q 0 > q s (see Figure 2 below is close to ¡1 then q i 2 (0; q ¤ ).
Proof: If g 0 (q s ) < ¡1 then in the (q t ; q t+1 ) plane g is steeper than h where they intersect on the 45 o line. Given g(0) = h(0) = 0, the curves must intersect o® the 45 o line at some point (q l ; q h ). This means g 2 (q l ) = q l and g 2 (q h ) = q h . Hence the system has a 2-cycle. Technically, as g 0 passes through ¡1 the system undergoes a°ip bifurcation that gives rise to the cycle, which guarantees q l and q h will be close to q s if g 0 is close to ¡1. ¥
In (18) we found g 0 (q s ) = 1 +¯¸f (q s )e 0 (q s )=f 0 (q s ). For instance, if µ = 1 then g 0 (q s ) = 1 +¯¸q s u 00 (q s ), which suggests that su±cient curvature in u is required for g 0 (q s ) < ¡1. To consider an explicit example, suppose
where b 2 (0; 1) and´> 0. With µ = 1, we can solve explicitly for Similar results hold in other models, including overlapping generations models, although there seems to be a view that \unrealistic" parameter values are required in that context. In our model we need q t+1 = h(q t ) to be backward bending, just like in an overlapping generations model, but in that model the condition means the saving function is non-monotone in the rate of return, while here it means the demand for liquidity is non-monotone in in°ation, which seems to be a di®erent requirement. has the same price). We balance the budget with lump sum taxes.
To derive the equilibrium conditions with°6 = 0, simply add the term°m t minus the lump sum tax to the right hand side of the budget constraint in (2) , and notice that now W t (m) = W t (0) + (Á t +°)m. The bargaining solution is as in (6) except we replace Á t with Á t +°in the de¯nitions of m 
where e and f are as before, although now Á t = f (q t )=M ¡°. Hence, q t = g°(q t+1 ) where g°is de¯ned by (19) . Figure 3 shows the dynamical system for three cases:°< 0,°= 0, and°> 0. The°= 0 case was analyzed above, and we now consider the cases°< 0 and°> 0 in turn. q inherits the stability properties of the nonmonetary steady state from the case°= 0, so it is locally stable. Now q = 0 is still a steady state (where agents dispose of money, given°< 0) but it is unstable; indeed, for any q 0 2 (0; q) we have q t ! q. Although q is locally stable, q t may not converge to it if q 0 > q; it is possible that q t will converge to another steady state q or cycle around q (this cannot happen in Figure 3 , because h is single valued, but it can happen in general).
If°> 0 then g is shifted to the right. Then there is a unique monetary steady state, and it is above the q s that prevailed with°= 0. One can generalize Lemma 3 to show that q t can never exceed q ¤ : as we will argue shortly, equilibria only exist for°below some threshold°, and given µ = 1 and°=°, we have q = q ¤ is a steady state, while otherwise q t < q ¤ 8t.
First, notice that°> 0 implies q = 0 is not an equilibrium. Thus,°> 0 eliminates the nonmonetary steady state, and any path converging to q = 0.
Also, suppose a monetary steady state does not exist with°= 0; i.e., suppose Figure 3 does not intersect the 45 o line when°= 0. When°> 0, it is obvious from (19) that g°must intersect the 45 o line at some q > 0, so there necessarily is a monetary steady state.
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To complete the analysis of°> 0 we characterize the maximum feasible 9 Intuitively, even if you believe money has no exchange value, you would still be willing to give some positive q for it so as to get the interest°. Similar results hold in models where m 2 f0; 1g (Li and Wright [1998] ).
interest payment°. First, with°6 = 0 (17) becomes
Second, we can generalize Lemma 5 to show¯(Á t+1 +°) · Á t . In steady state this reduces to°·
Any equilibrium has to satisfy this condition.
Suppose we set°to the maximum feasible°, satisfying (21) with equality.
Then (20) becomes
for any µ < 1, however, e(q) = 1 holds at q s < q ¤ and°=°(q s ) <°¤. That is, given µ = 1 the maximum interest we can pay is°¤, and it implies q s = q ¤ 8t is an equilibrium (indeed, the unique equilibrium); given µ < 1, however, the maximum interest we can pay is°<°¤, and it implies the steady state is q s < q ¤ .
We interpret°=°¤ as the Friedman Rule for interest on currency. One can derive similar results if, rather than paying interest, we contract the money supply so Á t increases with t: the maximum de°ation rate consistent with monetary equilibrium (Á t+1 =Á t = 1=¯) is the optimal policy, and it achieves the e±cient outcome i® µ = 1. Yet there is one signi¯cant di®erence:
with de°ation and¯at money (°= 0) the nonmonetary equilibrium always exists; with interest payment°¤, given µ = 1 the e±cient outcome is the unique equilibrium. 10 We summarize the key results as follows:
Proposition 4 Suppose°> 0. Then there is some maximum feasible°. If µ = 1,°=°¤ and it implies the unique equilibrium is q t = q ¤ 8t. If µ < 1,°<°¤ and q t < q ¤ 8t. In any case,°> 0 implies there is no equilibrium with q t = 0 or q t ! 0. Now suppose°< 0. Then there is some°< 0 such that°2 (°; 0) implies multiple equilibria, all of which have q t < q ¤ 8t, while°<°i mplies there are no monetary equilibria.
Sunspots
Let s t be a stochastic process with no e®ect on fundamentals but potentially with an e®ect on behavior due to expectations. Assume s t is known at t before the decentralized market opens, but s t+1 is random with distribution function G(s t+1 js t ). In general, all variables now need to be indexed by s as well as t. In a stationary equilibrium we need to index things by s but not by t. Much of this section will focus on stationary equilibria, but we will also consider brie°y nonstationary sunspot equilibria.
We begin with an example where°= 0. The example constructs a nonstationary sunspot equilibrium along the lines of Cass and Shell (1983) by randomizing across deterministic equilibria. Assume the graph of q t+1 = h(q t )
is a correspondence, so that given some q 0 there are two distinct values, q H 1 and q L 1 , both in (0; q ¤ ) and both satisfying q 1 = h(q 0 ). This means that
holds at both q 1 = q H and q 1 = q L .
there are no equilibrium paths leading to q = 0. If h 0 > 0 at q ¤ then there clearly can be no nonstationary equilibria. If h 0 < 0 at q ¤ then paths starting near q ¤ must oscillate around q ¤ , which violates the result that q t · q ¤ . Hence q t = q ¤ for all t is the unique equilibrium.
Now suppose we set q 1 = q H with probability ¼ and q 1 = q L with probability 1 ¡ ¼.
To be more precise, we set prob(s = s 1 ) = ¼ and prob(s = s 2 ) = 1 ¡ ¼, and the equilibrium is as follows: s = s 1 implies q 1 = q H while s = s 2 implies q 1 = q L , and for t > 1 we follow a deterministic equilibrium path from q 1 . Proceeding as above, the generalized equilibrium condition is
Clearly, if the equilibrium condition for the deterministic economy holds at both q H and q L then the equilibrium condition for the economy with sunspots also holds.
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We now consider stationary sunspot equilibria, where at every date q = q(s). We omit t subscripts and write, e.g., q t = q and q t+1 = q +1 . The generalization of (3) is
where E is the expectation with respect to G(s +1 js). As in Lemma 1, W (m; s)
is linear. The bargaining solution is as in (6), except m ¤ (s) and b q(m; s) are indexed by s, and (8) becomes
Following Peck (1988) one can also construct a sunspot equilibrium which is not a randomization over deterministic equilibria, even if h is a function. Consider (22) , and suppose that R 0 > 0 where R(q 1 ) denotes the right hand side (it is not hard to make assumptions to guarantee this). Then let q H = q 1 + " and
Therefore, we can choose the probability ¼ so that the equilibrium condition for the sunspot economy (23) will hold.
where v(m; s) is the obvious generalization of (9).
The relevant¯rst order conditions are
and b q 0 is as above. Notice that m +1¸m ¤ (s +1 ) with probability 1 implies
; s +1 ) = 0 with probability 1, and thus (24) implies E [Á(s +1 ) +°] = ¡1 Á(s) > Á(s) with probability 1. At least with°· 0, this is cannot be { we cannot expect Á(s) to rise in every state in a stationary equilibrium { and so we have m +1 < m ¤ (s +1 ) with positive probability. However, it is not necessarily true that m +1 < m ¤ (s +1 ) with probability 1.
The conditions in Lemma 6 now imply v 00 · 0 8s with strict inequality if m +1 < m ¤ (s +1 ). Hence, there is a unique solution to (24) , and F is again degenerate at m +1 = M . Let B = fs : M < m ¤ (s)g be the set of realizations for s such that q < q ¤ . Inserting v 0 into (24), we have
where Q(s) is the equilibrium value of q in state s and e(q) is de¯ned above. 
It is always possible for agents to ignore sunspots; e.g. if°= 0 one solution is Q(s) = q s 8s where q s is the steady state in the model without sunspots, and another is Q(s) = 0 8s. Or, if°< 0 but j°j is not too big, then there are two monetary steady states without sunspots, called q and q in the previous section. Here we are interested in a proper sunspot equilibrium, or a non-constant solution Q(s).
At this point, mainly to reduce notation, we set µ = 1 so that e(q) = u 0 (q) and f(q) = q. Now consider the case s 2 fs 1 ; s 2 g, with prob(s +1 = s 2 js = s 1 ) = H 1 and prob(s +1 = s 1 js = s 2 ) = H 2 (H j is the probability of leaving state s j ). Let q j = Q(s j ). One possibility is that B contains both states { say, q 1 < q 2 < q ¤ { in which case we have
We seek a solution to this system with q 1 < q 2 < q ¤ . For this, we mimic what one does in overlapping generations models.
One way to proceed is to follow where q t = g°(q t+1 ) is precisely the dynamical system in the previous section.
That is, with H 1 = H 2 = 1 we have reduced our search for sunspot equilibria to a search for 2-cycles. We know a 2-cycle exists if g 0 < ¡1 by Proposition 3 and the explicit example. Since the system of equations in question is continuous in (H 1 ; H 2 ) there also exist stationary sunspot equilibria with q 1 < q 2 < q ¤ for some H j < 1.
Another way to proceed is to set°< 0 and then try to construct sunspot equilibria from the two monetary steady states, similar to Cass and Shell (1983) . To begin, set H 1 = H 2 = 0, so that
These two equations are identical, but can have two di®erent solutions: the two monetary steady states in Figure 3 . Thus, we can set q 1 = q 2 (0; q ¤ ) and q 2 = q 2 (q; q ¤ ). By continuity, there exists a solution q 1 < q 2 < q ¤ for some H j > 0.
We summarize the key results of this section as follows:
Proposition 5 When h is a correspondence, sunspot equilibria exist where given q 0 we randomize over q 1 . When there is a 2-cycle, stationary sunspot equilibria exist when H j is near 1. When there exist multiple monetary steady states, stationary sunspot equilibria exist when H j is near 0.
Conclusion
This paper has pursued a line, due to Cass and Shell (1980) , that says it is desirable to work with monetary models that are \genuinely dynamic and fundamentally disaggregative" and also allow \diversity among households and variety among commodities." Recent search-theoretic models¯t this description well. We showed here that these models, like some other models, generate interesting dynamics. This helps us to understand how alternative monetary theories are related, and gives further support to the notion that extrinsic dynamics and uncertainty matter. One possible advantage of our framework is that the parameter values needed for°uctuating equilibria may not be as empirically implausible, and certainly the implied period length seems more empirically relevant, that in some other models. 
